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List: best-of-security
Subject: FBI Files: Clipper Must be Mandatory (fwd)
From: Julian Assange <proff () suburbia ! net>
Date: 1995-08-21 15:55:52
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>From owner-sea-list@panix.com Tue Aug 22 00:54:10 1995
Message-Id: <199508211434.KAA28090@panix3.panix.com>
Subject: FBI Files: Clipper Must be Mandatory (fwd)
To: sea-legal@panix.com, sea-list@panix.com
Date: Mon, 21 Aug 1995 10:34:11 -0400 (EDT)
From: simona@panix.com (Simona Nass)
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The other shoe dropped. -S.
Forwarded message:
>To: (Recipient list suppressed)
>From: Dave Farber <farber@central.cis.upenn.edu>
>Subject: FBI Files: Clipper Must be Mandatory
>
>
>
>FOR RELEASE: August 16, 1995, 2:00 p.m. EST
>
>
> WASHINGTON, DC - Newly-released government documents show
>that key federal agencies concluded more than two years ago that
>the "Clipper Chip" encryption initiative will only succeed if
>alternative security techniques are outlawed. The Electronic
>Privacy Information Center (EPIC) obtained the documents from the
>Federal Bureau of Investigation under the Freedom of Information
>Act. EPIC, a non-profit research group, received hundreds of
>pages of material from FBI files concerning Clipper and
>cryptography.
>
> The conclusions contained in the documents appear to conflict
>with frequent Administration claims that use of Clipper technology
>will remain "voluntary." Critics of the government's initiative,
>including EPIC, have long maintained that the Clipper "key-escrow
>encryption" technique would only serve its stated purpose if made
>mandatory. According to the FBI documents, that view is shared by
>the Bureau, the National Security Agency (NSA) and the Department
>of Justice (DOJ).
>
> In a "briefing document" titled "Encryption: The Threat,
>Applications and Potential Solutions," and sent to the National
>Security Council in February 1993, the FBI, NSA and DOJ concluded
>that:
>
> Technical solutions, such as they are, will only work if
> they are incorporated into *all* encryption products.
> To ensure that this occurs, legislation mandating the
> use of Government-approved encryption products or
> adherence to Government encryption criteria is required.
>
> Likewise, an undated FBI report titled "Impact of Emerging
>Telecommunications Technologies on Law Enforcement" observes that
>"[a]lthough the export of encryption products by the United States
>is controlled, domestic use is not regulated." The report
>concludes that "a national policy embodied in legislation is
>needed." Such a policy, according to the FBI, must ensure "real-
>time decryption by law enforcement" and "prohibit[] cryptography
>that cannot meet the Government standard."
>
> The FBI conclusions stand in stark contrast to public
>assurances that the government does not intend to prohibit the use
>of non-escrowed encryption. Testifying before a Senate Judiciary
>Subcommittee on May 3, 1994, Assistant Attorney General Jo Ann
>Harris asserted that:
>
> As the Administration has made clear on a number of
> occasions, the key-escrow encryption initiative is a
> voluntary one; we have absolutely no intention of
> mandating private use of a particular kind of
> cryptography, nor of criminalizing the private use of
> certain kinds of cryptography.
>
> According to EPIC Legal Counsel David Sobel, the newly-
>disclosed information "demonstrates that the architects of the
>Clipper program -- NSA and the FBI -- have always recognized that
>key-escrow must eventually be mandated. As privacy advocates and
>industry have always said, Clipper does nothing for law
>enforcement unless the alternatives are outlawed."
>
> Scanned images of several key documents are available via the
>World Wide Web at the EPIC Home Page:
>
> http://www.epic.org/crypto/ban/fbi_dox/
>
>
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